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Abstract: 
May argues successfully that many claims about the causal influence of affect on moral 
judgment are overblown. But the findings he cites are compatible with many of the key 
arguments of philosophical sentimentalists. His account of rationalism, in turn, relies on an 
overly broad notion of inference, and leaves open crucial questions about how we reason to 
moral conclusions. 
 
 
In the first part of Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind, Joshua May mounts a bold defense 
of a form of moral rationalism against sentimentalism. But what exactly is his target, and 
does he offer a credible alternative? 
 As I’ve observed previously (Kauppinen 2014a), sentimentalism comes in many 
logically independent forms, in which emotions or more broadly pro- and con-attitudes play 
different roles. Explanatory sentimentalists hold that sentimental reactions fundamentally 
explain our moral verdicts; judgment sentimentalists hold that moral judgments consist in 
sentiments or otherwise make essential reference to sentiment; metaphysical sentimentalists 
hold that moral properties are grounded in actual or possible sentimental responses; and 
epistemic sentimentalists hold that we come to know moral truths ultimately by way of 
sentimental responses. Sentimentalists offer different sorts of a priori arguments for these 
claims, appealing, for example, to the apparent importance of attitudes that have a world-to-
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mind fit in explaining the action-guiding character of moral thought. Recently, some 
sentimentalists, most notably Jesse Prinz (2007) and Shaun Nichols (2004), have also 
offered a posteriori arguments for these views, drawing on scientific findings. 
 It is the a posteriori arguments that are May’s main target, while he merely points to 
arguments of others when it comes to a priori sentimentalism. This is worth emphasizing for 
two reasons. First, though May mounts a very promising case against the a posteriori 
arguments, we may nevertheless have sufficient reason to subscribe to a sentimentalist view 
on a priori grounds. Second, I think it’s fair to say that what defines the various 
sentimentalist views are the conclusions of the a priori arguments. Only explanatory 
sentimentalists, for example, are committed to causal claims about the role of emotion in 
generating moral judgments, and these claims are sometimes significantly weaker than 
May’s targets. Adam Smith, for example, holds that “the greater part of our moral judgments 
… [is] regulated by maxims and ideas derived from an induction of reason”, while arguing 
that it is “absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first perceptions of right and wrong 
can be derived from reason” (Smith 2002, 377). On this kind of view, emotions don’t play a 
causal role in every moral judgment, but rather explain why we find certain act-types right or 
wrong in the first place. According to even more modest social transmission views, emotions 
play a causal role in explaining why certain patterns of moral judgment prevail and get 
transmitted (Nichols 2004, Kauppinen 2014b). Assuming that people pick up their 
moralizing tendencies from others, this view entails that emotions ultimately (but indirectly) 
explain even the judgments of those who never respond emotionally.  
The evidence May adduces in Chapter 2 against exaggerated claims about the causal 
influence of emotion on moral judgment is compatible with a view like Smith’s being true. 
And of course it doesn’t bear on other varieties of sentimentalism, which make no causal 
claims in the first place. The best kind of evidence against a Smithian sort of explanatory 
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sentimentalism would show that there are individuals who lack the postulated kind of 
sentiments altogether, but nevertheless make genuine moral judgments. The closest results in 
this respect come from studies on psychopaths – but alas, it is far more ambiguous, since 
psychopaths do have emotions (even if abnormal), and there is active debate on whether 
their moral judgments are genuine (see e.g. Smith 1994). And the social transmission view is 
of course not committed to the claim that emotions directly explain the judgments of 
particular individuals, so it is not necessarily threatened even if psychopaths know perfectly 
well what’s right or wrong.  
Why hold on to even modest explanatory sentimentalism, however, if the observed 
effects of emotional manipulation are as weak as May argues? Perhaps the most convincing 
argument is based on the close parallel between independently evolved emotional tendencies 
and widely accepted moral principles. There is an extremely plausible adaptive rationale for 
the tendency of social animals like us to have negative emotional responses to actions like 
cheating, failing to reciprocate, insulting, and grabbing a share of resources that is 
disproportionate to one’s contribution (e.g. Sober and Wilson 1998). Other primates have 
analogous responses, which lends additional credence to the claim that they are independent 
of moral judgment. Yet there is a striking parallel – even if not an exact correspondence – 
between these adaptive emotional tendencies and widespread patterns of moral judgment 
(e.g. Boehm 2012). Some use such facts as a premise in a debunking argument of moral 
beliefs (Street 2006), but that’s not the sentimentalist claim. The explanatory sentimentalist 
contention is that the parallel is best explained by the fact that moral judgment is deep down 
driven by emotion, though competing accounts differ on the details of just how this happens. 
David Hume (2006, 260), for example, emphasizes the need to correct for bias in our 
untutored responses for morality to perform its social function. (This would explain why 
there is only a parallel, not an exact correspondence.) For the rationalist, in contrast, the 
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parallel between adaptive emotion and moral judgment is a coincidence: reason just happens 
to tell us to disapprove of the very things we in any case tend to feel negatively about, at 
least when we are ourselves at the receiving end. This comparison does not flatter the 
rationalist. 
So far, I’ve focused on what sentimentalism is and what it isn’t. Let’s now turn to 
rationalism, as May understands it. His claim is that “moral judgment is fundamentally an 
inferential enterprise that is not ultimately dependent on non-rational emotions, sentiments, 
or passions.” (7) May relies here on an extremely broad conception of inference, which 
includes “unconscious, unreflective, or implicit processes that nonetheless amount to 
reasoning” (55). But he acknowledges that not every transition among beliefs (or other 
contentful states) amounts to reasoning (9). Otherwise rationalism would be devoid of 
distinctive content. 
What is reasoning, then? Here we must bear in mind that bad reasoning, too, is a kind 
of reasoning, so we can’t appeal to what are in fact genuine requirements of rationality 
(Broome 2013). It is common to hold that at least the following elements are necessary: 
doxastic states whose contents serve as premises, doxastic or conative states whose contents 
express the conclusion, and some form of endorsement of the move from the premises to the 
conclusion, such as tacit acceptance of a pertinent rule of inference or taking the conclusion 
to follow from the premises (Boghossian 2014).  
While this minimalist account is compatible with non-conscious reasoning, many of 
the computational mental processes that May argue play a role in moral judgment do not 
qualify as inference by its lights, since any kind of inference requires both premise-beliefs 
and somehow basing the conclusion on their content. For example, May holds that 
categorization of an ordinary object as a piece of furniture involves inference from a belief 
or belief-like state like “This objects resembles sofas, chairs, and tables” (70). However, this 
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is a non-starter as an account of categorization, as the very same (non-inferential) 
recognitional capacity that allows us to categorize something as furniture is required in order 
to make the judgment that it resembles items in the furniture category. If we can perform the 
latter without inference (and surely there are some such judgments on anyone’s view), 
there’s no reason to think unconscious inference must be involved in the former. Similar 
considerations hold for high-level perception (e.g. Audi 2013), like the perception that 
someone is on drugs – we can be sensitive to complex information without any kind of 
inference from premises to a conclusion. 
The same goes for moral categorization: there’s no evidence for a necessary 
inferential step. Curiously, May half-acknowledges that the evidence fits the alternative 
hypothesis that our principles like the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing merely describe the 
pattern of our moral judgments rather than guide them (70). What makes this only a half-
acknowledgement is that he describes this in terms of “reasoning in accordance with” the 
principle. But that our judgments accord with a principle is no evidence at all that they result 
from reasoning – indeed, if it is acknowledged that the principle doesn’t guide our reasoning, 
it would be a miracle of sorts if reasoning guided by some other rule yielded the same output 
in every case. 
Second, even if we were to accept May’s broad notion, the evidence he cites only 
shows that inferences about non-normative facts, such as the extent to which the agent was 
involved in bringing about the outcome, play a role in moral judging. This is something that 
sentimentalists accept. Already Hume emphasized that while sentiment renders the final 
verdict, “in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a proper discernment of its 
object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice 
distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn” (Hume 2006, 189). So even on the arch-
sentimentalist Hume’s view, it’s not only true that moral sentiments are “sensitive to 
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information” (74), but also that they sometimes require conscious reasoning about non-
normative facts. What he and other sentimentalists deny is simply that this suffices to explain 
or justify moral judgment, since there is a gap between non-normative and normative 
conclusions. On their view, emotions don’t just “facilitate” inference by directing attention, 
but either fundamentally explain or justify crossing the gap. Unless May shows that the 
process that takes us from non-moral premises regarding, say, intentions and consequences, 
to moral verdicts is distinctively rational, his view is importantly incomplete. 
Finally, and related to the previous point, any process of inference must begin from 
premises, which on pain of regress can’t always be justified by further inference. Take the 
following simple piece of (good) reasoning: 
1) Clinton lied. 
2) Lying is wrong. 
3) So, Clinton did something wrong. 
No one denies that it is possible to reason from premises 1 and 2 to conclusion 3, and 
thereby gain justification to believe 3, if one is justified in believing the premises. But what 
justifies belief in premise 2? (Let’s assume for simplicity that it’s true.) On pain of a 
different regress, the answer can’t be ‘testimony’. So traditional intuitionists say, roughly, 
that it is self-evident: anyone who understands the content thereby has justification to believe 
in it (Audi 2013). Many epistemic sentimentalists say, roughly, that it is a legitimate 
inductive generalization from the contents of emotional responses, such as resentment, that 
present particular acts of lying as wrong (e.g. Tappolet 2015). These are both the right kind 
of answers in that they don’t appeal to further premises. May does not argue against such 
views. But more importantly, while he discusses evidence that we engage in reasoning from 
moral principles, I was unable to find any discussion of how we reason to moral principles, 
although he acknowledges the need in passing (79). 
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To sum up, May tends to construe sentimentalism extremely thinly, as a claim that 
moral judgments are explained by or consist in purely non-cognitive feelings, and 
rationalism extremely broadly, as something like the claim that moral judgments are 
sensitive to information about their targets. On such construals, it’s easy to declare 
rationalism as the better theory. But as I’ve tried to sketch here, at least when it comes to 
philosophy, both of these characterizations are ill-fitting. More work is needed to refute the 
arguments that sentimentalists actually make, and to develop a credible rationalist alternative. 
It is thus fortunate that most philosophical sentimentalists from Hume and Smith 
onwards are no less optimistic than May. They hold that as long as there is “some particle of 
the dove, kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wolf and serpent” (Hume 
2006, 259), we will approve of just and benevolent actions, constrain our egoism in virtue of 
internalizing the reactive attitudes of actual or imagined others, and make moral progress by 
reasoning about non-moral facts before rendering our judgment and by extending our natural 
empathy beyond our immediate circle. Doesn’t it warm your heart just to think about it? 
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